Jottings

Jottings III: the problem with propositions

In a previous post we discussed computational vs “biological thinking” and the question of why we assume that chunking the world in a specific way is automatically right. The outcome was that it is not obvious why the sentence (i) Linda is a bank teller and a feminist should always be analysed as containing two propositions that each can be assessed for truth and probability. It is quite possible that given the description we are given the sentence actually is indivisible and should be assessed as a single proposition. When asked, then, to assess the probability of this sentence and…

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Jottings

Jottings II: Style of play, style of thought – human knowledge as a collection of local maxima

Pursuant to the last note, it is interesting to ask the following question: if human discovery of a game space like the one in go centers around what could be a local maxima, and computers can help us find other maxima and so play in an “alien” way — i.e. a way that is not anchored in human cognition and ultimately perhaps in our embodied, biological cognition — should we then not expect the same to be true for other bodies of thought? Let’s say that a “body of thought” is the accumulated games in any specific game space, and…

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Jottings

Jottings I: What does style of play tell us?

If we examine the space of all possible chess games we should be able to map out all games a really played look at how they are distributed in the game space (what are the dimensions of a game space, though?). It is possible that these games cluster in different ways and we could then term these clusters “styles” of play. We at least have a naive understanding of what this would mean. But what about the distribution of these clusters overall in a game space – are they equally distributed? Are they parts of mega clusters that describe “human…

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